Review

The Impact of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s New Diplomacy on Africa: The Case of Mali and Somalia-Somaliland

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Since appointed as Turkish foreign minister on 1 May 2009, Davutoğlu’s diplomacy has had an impact on the Turkish-African relations. Compared with the previous governments in Turkey, his diplomacy has assigned values to the sub-Saharan Africa, and his mediatory role in the conflict and settlement processes in Mali and Somalia-Somaliland have aroused excitement throughout the continent. One can argue that this is because Turkey has not only historical connections with these nations, but also shares religious values that enable trouble-free diplomatic interventions. This paper explores the impact of Davutoğlu’s diplomacy in Mali and Somalia-Somaliland, demonstrating that Davutoğlu has attempted to address the conflicts in the sub-Saharan Africa. This paper establishes that he has offered a number of mechanisms in those conflicts in order to realize his foreign policy objectives set forth in his new vision towards Africa. This paper concludes that Davutoğlu’s diplomacy in Mali and Somalia-Somaliland, aims to fill the gap which emerged after nearly centuries of negligence of Turkish-African relations.

Key words: Davutoğlu, diplomacy, Africa, Mali, Somalia-Somaliland, conflict

INTRODUCTION

The political issues in the sub-Saharan Africa seem to have attracted unprecedented attention from Turkey, bearing in mind that the region is viewed as a neglected part of the globe. Under the guidance of Davutoğlu’s doctrine, however, Turkey now attaches importance to peace and stability in Africa. The shifting tides of the relations has developed several questions about the Turkish strategies for its growing interest. Since Africa has never been quite an issue with the previous governments in Turkey, what impact could Davutoğlu’s doctrine have in the conflicts in Mali, Somalia and Somaliland? This paper aims to discuss the impact of Davutoğlu’s diplomacy in Mali and Somalia-Somaliland conflicts. In order to better understand his role in those conflicts, we begin with the definition of diplomacy and, Davutoğlu’s vision in foreign policy.
Diplomacy

The dictionary definition of diplomacy is “the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations,” and “skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility” (Saunders, 1990; Laqueur, 1995: 19-24). Reaching back into antiquity, diplomacy has also entailed mediation, or managing an entity or an individual’s relationships with “another” (sometimes defined as “enemy”, sometimes not). It was only with the development of the modern state system, dating from the 16th century, that diplomacy took on its more narrow current contemporary meaning: managing the foreign affairs of states at the governmental level. Though, today both scholars and practitioners suggest that this narrow interpretation has lost its utility. (Saunders, 1990).

Most broadly understood, diplomacy can be described as a positive value concept encompassing a set of skills; a preferred way to approach issues at the subnational, national, or international levels. Diplomacy in its conflict resolution and community-building aspects can certainly be argued normatively-not to mention, studied empirically-as a preferred approach to most political issues, even those alleged to be purely domestic ones. It is, as such, normatively preferable to a confrontational approach, and frequently more descriptively accurate.

Diplomacy as behavior, a system of approaching issues and problems, offers less fanatic and lethal, as well as more fruitful, ways to approach both intellectual and practical questions than confrontational approaches do. It helps ground theory in practice, and encourages groups to alter the views of those who define them foremost as the “enemy”. It also offers a broader basis from which to approach organizational reform. Renewed interest in ethical issues in international relations also suggests a natural broadening of diplomatic concerns. Multicultural nations, such as Russia and India, see such considerations as important to their perception of both domestic and international relations. Diplomats cannot deal with such issues as Bosnia and foreign assistance without involving the value dimension; hence wise intellectuals and effective policy makers must do so as well. The pressing need is to bring them into better communication with each other in a suitably expanded framework.

On the practical side, particularly in the post-World War II period, there has been controversy over the question of what activities constitute the operational core of diplomacy. In the early post-World War II years, not all students or practitioners accepted considering foreign assistance or an organizing information effort as “diplomatic” activity, for example. To set an example, in the post-Cold War period, even as early as the mid-1980’s, the use of political party institutes for instruction in campaign and governing techniques under the aegis of the national endowment for democracy emerged as an extremely useful tool to educate Russia and the other countries of the ex-Soviet Bloc in concepts and skills needed to organize democratic governments in a market-oriented world. In fact, until only four decades ago such aid had to be offered covertly.

As definitional questions shade further into operational ones, it should be reemphasized that the points made above apply to most so-called “domestic” political issues as well as foreign/domestic ones. The heart of democratic politics is the idea that people can be persuaded to support specific policies or candidates, and that compromise is the stuff of politics. The linkages with diplomacy-as-negotiation/bargaining are easy to establish in the following ways: understanding the other side’s position, seeking common ground, bargaining across issues, seeking agreements all can support are the stuff of congressional and local politics. Within national and local affairs, the role of force is less salient, because the structure of authority backed by legitimate force is more clearly defined and understood and enjoys time and tradition built into it as well. However, lest one think that there is qualitative difference, a look at the breakdown of civic order in many parts of Africa and elsewhere suggests that the national/international distinction on the relationship of force and politics, even within states, too, is quickly blurring (Kaplan, 1994: 44-76). Having defined diplomacy as a concept, the next section will focus on Mali’s conflict and Davutoğlu’s approaches and positions within the crisis.

Davutoğlu Vision in Foreign Policy

As Kirişçi noted, “the political development, economic capabilities, dynamic social forces, and the ability to reconcile Islam and democracy at home have been the qualities that offer Turkey the possibility to develop and implement active and influential policies towards near and far neighbours like Africa and Asia” (Kirişçi, 2006: 96). Also, as Davutoğlu points out, Turkey will continue to contribute to security, stability, and prosperity in a wide range of territories beyond Turkey’s immediate neighborhood, while also commenting on Turkey’s projected activism in Africa in this way: “a country that undermines Africa cannot have an international standing” (Aras, 2009). In terms of geography, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey enjoys a unique status. As a large country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia vast landmass, it may also be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified feature. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating itself with one single region, and its diverse regional composition renders it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously and controlling an area of influence in its immediate environs (Aras, 2009).
As Davutoğlu argues in his seminal book, Strategic Depth, the physical distance and previous challenges of getting involved in these geographies no longer make sense in policy circles and among the public (Davutoğlu, 2001: 49, 409). Instead, what has emerged is a process of discovery of the ‘closeness’ of these geographies and their ‘availability’ for Turkey’s involvement through the instruments of revitalising past relations, unfolding cultural and civilisational affinities, and exploring opportunities for engagement. He further argues that Turkey’s engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, and from the European Union (EU) to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is a part of its holistic approach to foreign policy. These initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as it approaches 2023 (Aras, 2013: 5-6; Davutoğlu, 2001: 96). From this perspective, it appears that Turkey could emerge as an influential player from Africa to the Far East, and even beyond that.

Mali’s Conflict

The conflict in Mali began when Tuareg rebels launched an uprising in 2012, driving Mali’s army from the north as they sought to found a separate state they called “Azawad”. This revolt was swiftly interrupted by armed extremists, including al-Qaeda’s North African wing, an Arab-dominated group that has been operating in northern Mali for a decade. Many of the country’s black African majority then blamed the Tuareg and Arab groups for the violence that has threatened to tear apart their nation of 16 million people (Doyle, 2013). Northern Mali, an arid area the size of France, is the home of the nomadic Touareg tribes who for decades have been struggling to gain autonomy, if not full secession, from Bamako. The military coup in March 2012, gave them this chance, but they had barely seized the main northern towns from a demoralized Malian army when they in turn were defeated and ousted by armed Islamists, who set about imposing on the local population a harsh version of Sharia law. Their exactions, stoning for infidelity, and the destruction of ancient World Heritage shrines aroused much anxiety throughout the world.

The fear is that these extremist Islamist movements, AQMI (al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamic), MUJAO (Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest) and Ansar al-Din, turn a vast area of northern Mali into a regional base for international terrorism, threatening the security of the neighboring states and, thus, evoking the spectre of another Afghanistan-type scenario. The sheer size of northern Mali’s desert terrain; the weakness of the West African armies not well-trained for combat abroad and often preoccupied with security problems at home, such as the Boko Haram rebellion in Nigeria; the impressive military arsenal of the Islamists, much of it seized from Libya after late Muammar al-Qadhafi’s overthrow; the months it would take to bring the Malian army up to scratch; the widespread and widely-shared fear of being attracted into an interminable conflict; and other similar concerns have tamed the ardour of those who have been pressing for military action.

Taking the events in Mali as having been triggered by the radical Islamic insurgents, the government of Mali requested for the French military assistance. Supported by the United Nations (UN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and most of the Western world, the French sent a military force to help the Malian government deployed under the UN security council resolution 2085, which was passed in December 2012, and allowed for a 3, 300-strong African-led mission to intervene in Mali to oust the Islamists in the absence of any negotiated solution (Doyle, 2013).

France’s military operation in its former colony started in January 2013, following an unexpected advance of a Tuareg-based rebel offensive that seized the north and split the West African country into two. There were around 4,500 French soldiers stationed in the country, a deployment earlier requested by the Malian government. The French chief of defence staff, Adm Edouard Guillaud, reiterated that despite the ongoing attacks by rebels from the Gao province, French forces did not plan to stay in the country later than March 2013. There are also around 3, 800 troops on the ground from the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), a UN-backed military mission organised by the ECOWAS.

According to Edouard Guillaud:

“We are concerned that unilateral outside interventions only aggravate existing problems. This is not a stance targeting the French operation; this is a principle [that Turkey supports in all regional conflicts],” the diplomat said. “What we prioritize in Mali is ensuring stability in a way that the Malian government foresees and desires” (Donat, 2013).

According to Guillaud, the goal to recapture Mali on behalf of the Malian government and international community is nearly completed and the time is approaching when France will hand over the mission to African forces to maintain order. According to diplomatic sources, “handing over the reins to an African-based initiative, in accordance with the desire of the Malian government, is a step in the right direction” (Donat, 2013). In line with this, Turkey also sees the existence of the radical groups and their operations splitting Mali as a problem of stability.

Turkey’s Position

The French intervention in Mali did not quite set well with
Turkey, as Davutoğlu argued why the French of all people? Ignoring the deep linguistic, diplomatic, and commercial ties between France and many West African countries, not to mention the UN and African states' approval, Turkey complained that the former colonial power should not intervene. Turkey reacted in this way, perhaps, because it was not asked for armed assistance (Musings, 2013), and the Turkish media hinted that the real goal of the French was to exploit the natural resources of the region, as if Turkey and its close ally, China, were not already exploiting African resources on a major scale all over the continent (Musings, 2013). Whereas in the case of Libya, this initial opposition turned to approval once it was clear which way the wind was blowing.

In February 2012, Davutoğlu criticized the council over its decision to intervene in Mali crisis while also delaying taking action to end the two-year civil war in Syria. Sources in diplomatic circles suggested that Davutoğlu's reaction is more a criticism of the deadlock over the Syrian situation-a frustration Turkey has expressed in many platforms-than a position questioning the rapid French military intervention in Mali (Musings, 2013). Turkey was anxiously watching developments in Mali. The military action issued by the UN on the eve of the Malian conflict drew Turkey's attention to what it says is “inaction” on the part of the UN Security Council. Commenting on the French-led military operation in Mali, Turkish authorities expressed their desire for peaceful solutions to the Malian conflict. For them, it appears, the African-based mechanisms are the only way to restore political and military stability in Mali. Turkey, in every instance “prefers Africans to resolve their own problems” (Donat, 2013). Ensuring territorial and political integrity of Mali should, therefore, be the first priority for any outside operation.

**Davutoğlu’s Role in Mali’s Conflict**

Davutoğlu expressed the importance he attaches to the political stability and territorial integrity of Mali. However, Ankara welcomed Mali’s parliament resolution to install a roadmap on 29 January 2012 that aimed at restoring the territorial integrity of the country and holding free and transparent elections. The statement added that Turkey supports possible steps to end worrisome developments threatening Mali’s territorial integrity, independence, and national unity. Emphasizing that Ankara prefers Africans themselves to find a solution to the continent’s problems, the statement noted that Turkey supports the work of the African Union and the ECOWAS in cooperation with the international community-in particular the UN-regarding developments in Mali. Ankara added that it will intensively support activities within the OIC to find a peaceful solution based on democratic principles.

Based on his new diplomacy on Africa, Davutoğlu called on the OIC Secretary General, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and discussed the latest situation in Mali. He also conveyed Turkey’s opinion to İhsanoğlu for the possible steps to be taken in the near future in Mali. According to Davutoğlu’s spokesman, Selçuk Ünal, Turkey was always in favor of solving the Malian conflict through dialogue and diplomacy. Selçuk Ünal claims that Ankara was not happy with the French military intervention in Mali. He argues that “e don’t know whether this is related to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s harsh criticism of the former colonial ruler in Niger, without giving names” (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, 2013). The colonial ruler of Niger was France, just like Mali. Davutoğlu clearly reflects Ankara’s displeasure with the French intervention. According to him, “No country, whether unilaterally or with another country, should intervene”. It is possible to detect from Davutoğlu’s remarks that Ankara was not only disturbed by French intervention, but also by the support it received from other countries. It is only natural for the layperson to identify Davutoğlu’s targets as Western countries, such as the US and British support of Paris. However, Ankara hoped that the two organisations would take the lead role in the crisis. For Turkey, France was acting unilaterally with colonial schemes, but that was not the case at all.

Here, special attention must be paid to Mali’s neighboring countries, such as Nigeria, that sent its soldiers to Mali to support the French military in combatting the Islamist extremists, as well as Algeria’s decision to open its air space to French military planes. Even more important is the fact that the African Union (AU) and the ECOWAS supported French action. As noted above, France intervened upon the invitation of the Malian government, the UN security council resolution 2085, the AU, and the ECOWAS. On the other hand, Paris was undoubtedly concerned with protecting its own interests. Therefore, it cannot be accused of acting unilaterally in Mali’s conflict. Even the Security Council Resolution 2085, which was adopted in December 2012, was supported by Turkey, which called for the recovery of northern Mali from the Islamist extremists by international forces under African leadership. This means to restore the territorial integrity of Mali, as demanded by Davutoğlu, it is totally meaningless for Ankara to object on grounds that “it is not the African nations, but France that lead the action,” because no African countries objected to the intervention. Contrary to Turkey’s views, many African countries cooperated with the former colonial power against the Islamist extremists. Semih Idiz argues that Turkey’s grievances are meaningless in the face of widespread African support. (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, 2013).
The OIC Ministerial Contact Group on Mali

On 13 May 2013, Davutoğlu attended the OIC meeting of the contact group on Mali, in Jeddah. Underlining that the OIC is an extended family, Davutoğlu stated that it is not only a moral but a political responsibility for the OIC and its member states to demonstrate utmost solidarity with the Malians. Referring to Turkey’s assistance to Mali, Davutoğlu pointed out that Turkey supports international efforts which would be led by the AU, the ECOWAS, and the UN (Davutoğlu’s Speech, 2013). One can observe that the Turkish new foreign policy towards Africa is not only based on economic and trade objectives, but also incorporates a comprehensive approach which includes peace and stability.

In order to achieve enduring peace, stability and economic recovery in Mali, Davutoğlu emphasized that such solidarity should be focused on ensuring territorial integrity, national unity, and national reconciliation. Furthermore, he argued that those steps are necessary for the restoration of democratic order and sustainable economic recovery in Mali, and have to be administered simultaneously. With this understanding, Turkey welcomed the adoption of a transitional road map by the Malian national assembly, establishment of dialogue and reconciliation commission, and further steps for the realisation of presidential elections” (Davutoğlu’s Speech, 2013). He also mentioned that on a bilateral basis, as agreed on during the visit of the Malian minister of foreign affairs to Turkey, an action plan has been drafted aimed at the enhancement of cooperation in a variety of interrelated and intersecting areas”. He also proposed to host the next Contact Group meeting in Turkey (Davutoğlu’s Speech, 2013).

The Turkish led discussions established an executive committee and a contact group regarding the situation in Mali within the scope of the OIC (Donat, 2013). Turkey raised its proposals at the 12th Islamic Summit of the OIC, which also included establishing an aid fund for the war-torn country. While no specific decision was made at the summit, the proposals were taken into consideration, and the OIC member states made a joint decision condemning the acts of the terrorist groups as well as calling for assistance from “brotherly and friendly” governments at the request of Malian authorities. The decision also invited member states to provide logistical and financial support to AFISMA and those suffering in Mali. AFISMA was authorized by the UN Security Council in December 2012, to support the Malian government in the conflict.

Another conflict in Africa in which Davutoğlu mediated is that between Somalia and the Somaliland. In this aspect, shifting tides in Davutoğlu’s doctrine aroused curiosity Turkey’s long-term politics. Especially, with respect to the recent developments regarding Turkey’s policy towards the sub-Saharan Africa and the shifts in strategy and objectives pursued by Davutoğlu since the AKP came to power in 2002.

Somalia and Somaliland Conflict

The State of Somaliland was a short-lived independent state in the territory of modern-day Somalia (Cannadine, 2010). In May 1960, the British government declared that it would be prepared to grant independence to the then-protectorate of British Somaliland, with the intention that the territory would unite with the Italian-administered Trust Territory of Somalia, the former Italian Somaliland. The Legislative Council of British Somaliland passed a resolution in April 1960 requesting independence and union with the Trust Territory of Somalia, which was scheduled to gain independence on July the 1st. that year. The legislative councils of both territories agreed to this proposal following a joint conference in Mogadishu (Continin, 1969, p. 6).

On June 26, 1960, the former British Somaliland protectorate briefly obtained independence as the State of Somaliland, with the Trust Territory of Somalia following suit five days later (Contini, 1969: 6; The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2002: 835). On 27 June 1960, the newly convened Somaliland Legislative Assembly approved a bill that would formally allow for the union of the State of Somaliland with the Trust Territory of Somalia on 1 July 1960 (Garyqaan, 1960: 6; Contini, 1969: 6). Shortly after gaining independence from Great Britain as the State of Somaliland on 26 June 1960, Somaliland merged with Italian Somaliland on July 1, 1960 to form the Somali Republic. On July 20, 1961 and through a popular referendum, the Somali people ratified a new constitution, which was first drafted in 1960 (Cawl. & Farah, 1967: 338).

Although initially enthusiastic about forming a union with Italian Somaliland, the euphoria quickly changed to disenchantment as many in the north-west of Somalia felt increasingly marginalized in government and other sectors of the society.

Since its independence, Somaliland has been trying to extend its domination to include the Sanaag and Sool regions, leading to a conflict with neighboring Puntland’s armed forces, as the latter macro-region also claims that territory. In 1991, the traditional elders and political leaders representing some communities in the territory, Somaliland, met in Burao. The delegates agreed on two important issues, to seek reconciliation amongst the clans of Somaliland and to withdraw from the union with Somalia. The atrocities committed by the Somali state against the people of the Somaliland, it was felt, warranted secession. In that same year, Somaliland, northwest Somalia, the former British colony, declared independence unilaterally from the Federal Republic of Somalia and proclaimed Somaliland Republic, and a
significant majority of Somalilanders now support independent statehood—which has never been recognized internationally. The vast majority of southern Somalis oppose Somaliland’s independence. Somaliland sought for international recognition, firstly from Somalia. Many northern Somalis felt increasingly unwelcome in a nation they had voluntarily joined and sacrificed a lot for. However, the international community urged the two sides to find a negotiated solution to the problem.


Davutoğlu on Somalia-Somaliland

For its discredit, the international community has been reconfiguring Somalia’s solution for the last two decades, but never been successful. Such an attempt was concluded in London, in February 2012, where about 50 heads of international states, including Turkey, assembled in a day’s conference which was hosted by the British government, in order to reset a fresh tone on Somalia without success (“Somaliland: Turkish Foreign Policy”, 2013). Turkey’s most recent involvement in Somalia can be linked to its 2010 conference on Somalia which was held in Istanbul. Before the summit, Ankara’s interest in Somalia was quite marginal. In line with this, Turkish government invited the authorities from both Somalia federal government and Somaliland government to hold initial talks in Turkey. During the meeting, Davutoğlu also pledged to continue his support for the reconciliation, stability, prosperity, and development of Somalia. He also emphasized on Turkey’s commitment to the integrity of Somalia (Harte, 2013; “Somaliland: Turkish Foreign Policy”, 2013).

Davutoğlu met Somali President Mohamud before the two joined Somaliland President Sillanyo in a trilateral meeting, which was held behind close doors (Bezgin, 2013). Somaliland has proven the ideal platform for Turkey to test Davutoğlu’s doctrine while, at the same time, amassing an ever larger sphere of influence in Africa. Over the past years, Turkish leaders have been trying to paint Turkey’s global profile as a benevolent but powerful mediator in international crises. The success of Turkey’s virtuous power doctrine in Somalia shows “the potency of its soft power” (Bezgin, 2013).

During the talks, Davutoğlu pledged to continue his support for the reconciliation, as well as to the stability, prosperity, and development in Somalia. He also emphasized on Turkey’s commitment to the integrity of Somalia. As a part of this objective, the ‘Ankara Communiqué’, was signed by Somalian government and Somaliland which is of great importance and dealt with in detail as follows.

Ankara Communiqué

Following the meeting at Chevening House (the UK) of June 20-21, 2012 and the Dubai (UAE) of June 28, 2012, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of the Somali Federal Republic and President Ahmed Mohamed Sillanyo of Somaliland Government met on 13 April 2013 in Ankara. The meeting was hosted by the Government of Turkey at the request of the two parties. The purpose of this meeting was to reopen the dialogue after the change in the leadership of the Somali Federal Republic, and to establish a way forward for the dialogue. The two parties:

1. Expressed their commitment to the continuation of the Dialogue;
2. Endorsed the content of the Chevening house Declaration agreed on 21 June 2012, and the Dubai Statement signed on 28 June 2012;
3. Stated that the Dialogue is between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Government of Somaliland. The international community that is supporting this process will only provide facilitation when is needed;
4. Agreed to encourage and facilitate international aid and development provided to Somaliland;
5. Agreed the need to consolidate a cooperation on security sector through sharing intelligence, training as well as sharing scholarships for security sector professionals in order to become more effective in the fight against terrorism, extremism, piracy, illegal fishing, toxic dumping, maritime crime, and other major crimes;
6. Proposed to meet within 90 days in Istanbul at a date later to be agreed by the parties; and
7. Agreed to refrain from using any inflammatory language and any other act which may put the continuation of the Dialogue at risk (Bezgin, 2013; Jama, 2012).

Indeed, Turkey did well to find a peaceful solution to the problem between Somalia and Somaliland through dialogue. There are, perhaps, three essential factors attributed to Ankara’s approach to Somalia: Moral authority that defines Ankara’s Islamic values; business opportunity that makes Turkey a rising global economic competitor; and geo-strategic vision that is part of Ankara’s global roundabout ambition—a roundabout of different ideas, cultural, business, people, and innovation. Through the years, Turkey, the only Muslim member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and...
Somalia have managed to maintain a cozy relationship. As demonstrated in the Ankara Communiqué issued after the recent talks in Turkey, the two sides appear to have taken the least resistant path in the initial dialogue (Bezgin, 2013; Jama, 2012).

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to analyse the impact of Davutoğlu’s diplomacy on African conflicts with reference to Mali, Somalia and Somaliland crises. It is believed that Davutoğlu’s diplomacy and approach varied from one of crisis to another. In the case of Mali’s conflict, Davutoğlu’s position was different when compared with that of Somalia and Somaliland. In Mali, he appeared to be flexible and, in the meantime, supportive of a peaceful solution to the problem, stability and economic recovery. In the case of Somalia and Somaliland conflict, he saw an opportunity to put his new diplomacy into practice. (from this point onward, you need more analysis as the rest is repetition) For example, he organised a series of summits and meetings in order to resolve the conflict and bring peace between the two parties. During the meetings, Davutoğlu pledged to continue his support for the reconciliation, stability, prosperity and development of Somalia. He also emphasised on Turkey’s commitment to the integrity of Somalia and supports all decisions, which were made by the AU, ECOWAS and the international community. It is concluded here that since appointed as Turkish foreign minister on 1 May 2009, Davutoğlu’s diplomacy has made an impact on Turkey-African relations, especially, with the recent crisis in Mali, Somalia and Somaliland. This paper concludes that Davutoğlu’s diplomacy in hitherto neglected parts of the globe, Africa, is a new vision to Turkey-Africa relations, which certainly aims to fill the gap which emerged after nearly centuries of negligence.

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