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Full Length Research Paper

Déracinement of Foreign Alliances and Economic Policies Across Eurasia: Differential Association of Nations and its Consequences for Business, International Relations, and Society

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***Déracinement* of Foreign Alliances and Economic Policies plus some military alliances across Eurasia is evident recently with the realignment of India and Japan toward Russia economically, and India toward Russia militarily, in turn requiring the realignment of China and Taiwan toward each other and toward the United States, both economically and militarily, quietly and sometimes clandestinely. This poses consequences for the Brasil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) bloc of nations, three of which are Asian: Chinese imports from Japan, India's security from Pakistan, Eurasian and Trans-Pacific trade patterns. Also, it will require China to hasten its expansion across Pakistan (or Myanmar) in search of a West coast, and China's entry into Central and Eastern Europe for tariff reduction aims. Already, this *déracinement* has motivated China to improve its relations with some ASEAN nations, resulting in trade creation, investment creation, trade diversion, investment diversion, across Asia and beyond. Some Threats, many Opportunities, seem to be emerging. Foremost amongst them is the lurking question whether China will be a main participant (any participant at all) in the two colossal trade partnerships that are emerging: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The best options will be for China and other Asian nations to focus on new technologies and many new industries they will introduce, such as three-dimensional ("3D") printing, but instead China is bent on creating new investment partnerships, largely in Eurasia, transparently in order to dilute the influence of the Russian Federation and Turkey in former Soviet Union provinces.**

Keywords: *Déracinement*, Asia, Pantomime Empire, Differential Association of Companies, Differential Association of Nations, Encirclement. Ersatz Empire, Eurasia, Opposite borders, Typology of Criminal Nations, Ukraine

INTRODUCTION

Asia since 1945 has been a relatively stable region, with India, Japan, South Korea, and the Republic of China (Taiwan) allied strongly with the West, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc increasingly allied more with the West in the wake of China-inspired *déracinement* along coastlines of the South China Sea, Afghanistan and Pakistan seeming to chart a middle course, sometimes fluctuating, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) acting out erratically, and China remaining a challenge ideologically and rhetorically but a good economic partner in trade with the United States, European Union (EU), and Japan. Then, from 2013, an apparent *déracinement* of foreign economic policies followed swiftly by a *déracinement* of foreign military alliances commenced to emerge across Asia, provoking potentially untoward consequences in Asia, Eurasia, the Middle East, Western Europe and the entire world generally. An initial objective of this paper is to identify some causes and consequences of this apparent upheaval across Asia to Europe. A derivative objective is to analyse the impact of such an upheaval on Eurasian military alliances, and the resulting potential ramifications of Asian military *déracinement* on Asian and Western economic and military alliances and policies, but then to identify some antidotes to this toxic reality that cannot be allowed to continue and should be (should already have been) nipped in the bud. That they have not been nipped in the bud already is the result of Western inaction.

THE PEACE OF 1945

Following World War II the world entered into a 44 year "cold peace," known pejoratively as the "Cold War," the chill of which seemed to end with collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, Soviet Union) from 1989 to 1991. Of course, breezes of a cold wind erupted from time to time, but usually thawed quickly. What is taking place currently in Asia, the Middle East, and metastasizing through Turkey into Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is alarming and raises an important question: Why is this happening at this moment in time? Will this disrupt the Peace of 1945 permanently or at all, or is it a passing whim, possibly by China as it feels its own strength rising so rapidly, by India as it sees its strength rising but much more slowly than China's, by China and India as they witness the ASEAN block become increasingly prosperous, or by Japan as it comes to grim grips with the reality that its post-war economic strength is falling, perhaps proportionally to withdrawal of American management? Can this be controlled, or reversed if possible, to maintain the *status quo ante* or a semblance thereof and, even if so, is this really what the West will want? Is it really what the world at large will want? Is this related to or possibly the cause of China's Chongqing Military Command's warning that China must reform or will stand to encounter shame and lose wars (Blanchard 2015)?

DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION AMONGST NATIONS AND BUSINESSES

This paper is concerned with applied theory, it is non-empirical. Just as any theory requires an empirical testing, so does the application of differential association to international business or international relations amongst states. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, American criminologist Edwin H. Sutherland advanced a theory, new at that time, that tried to explain why some persons become criminals, others remain right thinking, although in many cases they share common backgrounds and characteristics. He called this the Theory of Differential Association (Sutherland 1947). Sutherland postulated that the core distinction lies in "an excess of definitions favorable to the law" in contrast to definitions unfavorable to law abiding behavior (1947, Siegel 2008, 154-163). In practice, Sutherland reasoned that young persons revere role models such as parents, extended family, priests, teachers, or at the other end of the morality spectrum, criminals: a youngster who bonds with a right-thinking person becomes right-thinking herself/himself; one who bonds with a criminal becomes a criminal. Differential Association lost favour in the 1980s, regained acceptance in the 21st century, but it has not been applied to international relations or legal entities (companies, partnerships) routinely. Of course, nations behave similar to people, largely because nations are steered by people: their heads of state or heads of government. Businesses are the same, managed by human beings who scope their surrounding environment whether they be State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or Small to Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs), regardless of the country in which they were chartered or in which they conduct current business.

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) hypothesized that juvenile delinquency can be explained as well as prevented by differential opportunity, an applied extension of differential association. Short (1975) suggested that general criminal behavior regardless of the offender’s age can be explained and prevented by differential opportunity, also. Pfohl (1994) took this to a greater extent by explaining that differential opportunity comports with core American values, and Simpson (1994, 2003) extended a similar concept to global governance. Strain theory in criminology hypothesizes that “a person deviates because of some external stress” (Brown, *et al*. 2010, p. 358), and this paper suggests that corporations and countries do the same thing for substantially the same reasons. Executives at the failed investment firm Enron reportedly worked under stress that emphasized corporate growth and individual financial rewards ahead of ethical behavior (Byrne 2002).

DEFINITIONS FAVORABLE OR UNFAVORABLE: TO WHAT, TO WHOM?

When we approach *déracinement* in any context, first concern must be focused on what change(s), if any, have taken place recently, and generally changes have taken place recently, sometimes abundantly. Within such change(s) will be witnessed the “definitions,” so that a distinction should be made between what is favourable and what is unfavourable: to what, to whom. In the context of international economic relations, this means “definitions” favourable or unfavourable to each given nation or, in reality, to each head of state or head of government, and in the context of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) or Transnational Corporations (TNCs), this means “definitions favourable or unfavourable to each given company, or in reality to each chief executive officer (CEO) in a “tall” hierarchical organisation or senior management team in a flat empowering organisation, and in some instances to each separate industry.

Definitions and their favourability or lack thereof will vary in time and space, of course, and both combinations and permutations (asymmetrical combinations) must also be anticipated. For purposes of this paper, the approach will be to explore definitions favourable or unfavourable to “The West,” by which is meant collectively the United States of America and its global Allies, the EU particularly including EU member states, in contrast to communist states such as the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “China”), post-communist states considered to be “illiberal democracies” such as the Russian Federation (hereinafter “Russia”), as well as definitions favourable or unfavourable to China or Russia. Left absent from this paradigm, or at least ambiguous within in, are illiberal democracies such as the Republic of Turkey, at once a NATO member but translucently (rapidly becoming rather transparently) harbouring an intention to reconstruct the Ottoman Empire, this time from Ankara instead of Constantinople. It is not so much that leaders of countries bond or fail to bond with foreign countries. They bond or fail to bond with foreign leaders as persons. The same remains constant for leaders of companies who will bond or fail to bond with their counterparts as competitors, customers, or suppliers. It is important to understand that leaders will be attracted to the foreign policies of some countries, be neutral toward others, be repulsed by still others, much as individuals will react in the context of their own personal behaviours in association with others. The remainder of this article will have to do with the impact of such definitions on the balance of economic power and derivatively the balance of military power across Asia, Eurasia, the Middle East, and Europe.

An emerging conundrum that outdistance most of the rest is China’s willful failure to define exactly what locations within the vast South China Sea it claims to be within its sovereignty, or for what reasons (Odgaard 2015), thus making it difficult for other nations to decide what area to enter, what area to avoid, whether bent on “innocent passage,” “transit passage,” military surveys, unrestricted military access by recognized states or harbouring other motives including piracy (U.S. Navy, J.A.G., The Law of the Sea). Figure 1 below outlines the “nine dash line” China has articulated without making much effort to clarify its ambiguities, made all the more difficult by China’s frequent addition to its claims by construction of artificial islands increasingly further away from its mainland or from natural islands it claims to fall historically within its sovereign jurisdiction. This example is a striking violation of international law that requires sovereign nations to expressly designate all territory claimed to be within their jurisdiction, including airspace and territorial waters, probably also including “economic zones,” although the Law of the Sea is unhelpfully vague in its own definition of these requirements (U.N.C.L.O.S., Part II).

Figure 1. Ambiguous Chinese Sovereign Claims, South China Sea, 2015.
SOURCE: Bratislav Milenkovic, published in Odgaard, Liselotte. 2015. “China’s Dangerous Ambiguity in the South China Sea,” The New York Times. 10 Dec. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/opinion/chinas-dangerous-ambiguity.html?_r=0

DEFINITIONAL CHANGES: FAVORABLE TO SOME, UNFAVORABLE TO OTHERS

Changes in definitions will turn out to be favorable to some actors (in this case nations and in some instances trans-national companies, together with their heads of state or government and their chief executives), unfavourable to others. This fact requires us to address definitions in the current context of international affairs, primarily international economic affairs, in the region that extends from the Western Pacific rim Westward across East Asia then South Asia then the Middle East and Eurasia to Eastern then Western Europe. Foremost is the United States involvement in the region, annually arming Chinese Taiwan, promising to defend Japan (Gates 2010), challenging the erection by China of artificial “islands” in the South China Sea where the Philippines has filed a complaint before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (“America Challenges” 2015), urging the extension of NATO Eastward into Western Ukraine and Montenegro (Heavey 2015), and expressing “regret” to Russia over Turkey’s shoot-down of its warplane that was engaging their common adversary, the Islamic “State” of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also called the Islamic “State” of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) because Syria is a state recognized by the global community (Boyer 2015), remaining silent amidst protests by Iraq that Turkey sent troops and heavy armaments into its territory near Mosul without advanced notice or permission (al Jazeera 2015). Then the German government stated it does not support a report by its own intelligence agency, BND, suggesting Saudia Arabia may be acting recklessly in the new alliances it is forming (German Government 2015).

In the second decade of the 21st century, the United States admitted to a policy shift of focus or “pivot” into Asia from other regions of the world, most notably Europe and the Middle East (Thayer 2011). Decidedly, this is a curse rather than a blessing to Russian Federation leaders and possibly to the Russian Federation itself. It is perceived as being a curse to China, also, although this perception is not entirely accurate. This will benefit some Chinese leaders more than it will others. It is perceived as being a blessing to Japan, but this perception also is not entirely accurate inasmuch as the West will be unlikely to choose Japan ahead of China, and definitely it will not benefit the rise of fascism in Japan, as evidenced by Europe's rejection of Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe's untoward remarks at the 2014 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, purporting to draw a nefarious nexus between 21st century tensions that rage between China and Japan and pre-1914 tensions between the Central Powers and The Alliance that instigated World War I (Chu 2014). All this taken together has precipitated the *déracinement* in the region. China negotiated a "corridor" across Pakistan to the Indian Ocean to provide China with a west coast, part of what China, following America, considers to be its own manifest destiny, that India deems a threat to its national security. This, together with India's perception of Pakistani political destabilization, prompted India to purchase increasingly larger shipments of armaments, first from the United States (Marshall 2008), then an aircraft carrier of Soviet vintage from the Russian Federation.

Among the most unfavourable definitions possible are definitions that involve the DPRK generally and China's relations with it in particular, in the immediate aftermath of DPRK dictator Kim Jong Un's execution of his uncle, Gen. Jang Song Thaek and all of Jang's relatives including former DPRK ambassador to Malaysia Jang Yong Chol who was Gen. Jang's nephew, with his entire family (Report 2014). General Jang's relations with China were close to the point where one could suppose that Jang was a Chinese operative in the DPRK. Jang took various business interests away from another general, O Kuk Ryol, the deputy air force chief of staff allegedly responsible for the dastardly attack on the Republic of Korea's warship *Cheonan* on 26 March 2010 that killed 46 personnel (N Korean General Regains Control of Interests 2014). Gen. O bears a striking facial likeness to executed Nazi war criminal Heinrich Himmler, the German *Reichsführer* who commanded the notorious *Schutzstaffel* ("SS" or Black Shirts) and *Gestapo* (secret police) during World War II in Europe, and his behaviour appears similar. In fact, the cult surrounding the DPRK leadership, epitomised in the exaggerated fanfare accompanying portraits of the three successive Kim leaders of the DPRK, fascism appears to have replaced communism in that country to the severe detriment of stability in that region.

Russia as a Pivot?

Across the first decade and into the second decade of the 21st century, the Russian Federation has given some appearances of moving closer to China (Track 2013). Fearing this possibility, India on China's Northwest and Japan on China's Northeast each have eyed a rapprochement with Russia, initially separately, but more recently together, growing tired of waiting to benefit from an American intervention intended to divide China and Russia. What this seeming rapprochement has done is to encircle China's northern perimeter, nearly cast a bonnet around China's Northern boundary, about which China has remained silent, more or less, because facially it continues to maintain friendship with Russia, even hosting joint military maneuvers under the facade provided by their joint Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) membership. With this bonnet wrapped around its Northern borders, China has little choice but to tread ever so carefully in relations with its neighbors to the South, the ASEAN block, that are drifting toward the United States for reasons similar to those that seem to explain why India and Japan have been moving toward Russia. Most alarming is Vietnam, once invaded by the United States and afterwards by China, now a growing partner of the United States in trade. Rumours have circulated that Vietnam invited United States naval assets to return to what used to be the large American naval base at Cam Ranh Bay (Carpenter 2012) that Vietnam denies, just as it denies willingness to permit Russia or any foreign power to have military bases there.

Arms Shipments: America to Taiwan, NATO to Turkey

Chinese Taiwan has received arms shipments almost annually since 1947, the direct consequence of the choices the administration of President Harry S. Truman made in 1950 as part of National Security Council (NSC) Paper No. 68 that created and then augmented the United States military-industrial complex. Such sale of arms has kept the American defense contracting industry alive and growing for nearly 65 years, the question becoming now when this industry will reach retirement age? More recently, the United States commenced to stock India with warplanes, including 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) ostensibly useful in Kashmir (Marshall 2008) to fight the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and its Indian Mujahedin, thereby inviting Russian arms dealers to call on India seeking competitive advantage. India and the Russian Federation surmise that this SIMI enjoys ties to the Pakistani and Chinese intelligence services. By investing in a burgeoning military-industrial complex, India and China are prioritising military materiel ahead of peaceful industries. Late in 2015, upon Turkey's shoot-down of a Russian warplane, NATO announced its plan to shore-up Turkish air defences with an influx of missiles to supplement the Patriots deployed there by Spain already (Emmott, Siebold and Mohammed 2015), an escalation some observers have forecasted is likely to dangerously increase risk of nuclear confrontation unnecessarily. Turkey has warned the United States and Russia not to arm Kurdish Syrian forces (Ridgwell 2015), apparently considering itself to be in command of what both permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will do.

Aircraft "Scarriers" Deployed Everywhere

Another highly visible definition to emerge in the waters of the Western Pacific rim and Indian Ocean is in the form of two venerable aircraft carriers from Soviet times, one sold to China, the latest to India, both obsolete, each valuable only as scarecrows to each country involved or potentially to naive pirates. Neither the Soviet Union's 1988 Admiral Kuznetsov class Riga, renamed the Varyag in 1990, that became China's Liaoning nor the Soviet Union's 1987 Admiral Gorshkov class Baku that became India's Vikramaditya confer any competitive advantage to either country against the West or countries ostensibly backed by the West such as Japan. They are not active duty aircraft carriers in any postmodern sense but only "scarriers" that are scarecrows aimed at provoking domestic nationalism. The Vikramaditya is named after a first century B.C.E. Emperor of Ujjain, India and means "bright as the sun." What they have succeeded in accomplishing is déracinement in the region, creating a senseless naval arms race that is turning into an air defense arms race They have already become shadows in the sun and stand to become dark holes in space, unless reversed. Definitions involving India's alliances are changing, toward the Russian Federation in some respects, perhaps in reaction to growing relations between China and Pakistan, the former India's arch economic rival, the latter India's arch military adversary over Kasmir. If so, this is an example of the doctrine of opposite borders favored by 19th century Imperial Russia during the Napoleonic period (Russia aligned with Austria and Great Britain against France and Denmark).

ADIZs: *E Unibus Plurum*?

China and Japan acting together have managed to change some definitions in the East China Sea, sparring needlessly over the rock islands that China calls Diaoyu and Japan Senkaku (Sanger 2013). Both countries claimed sovereignty for decades, but recently China extended its assertion of control over airspace above these islands and between them and the Chinese mainland, creating an "air defense identification zone" or ("ADIZ") within which all aircraft must announce and identify their presence ("Troubled Skies" 2013). The first action the United States Navy took was to fly B52 bombers into and across this airspace without complying with China's requirements, deeming them to be in violation of international laws. Predictably, other state actors in the region promptly expanded their ADIZs in retaliation, most recently South Korea (Keck, 2013). Several definitions abruptly changed in the East China Sea, and they portend implications and potential consequences for the Yellow Sea to the North and the South China Sea all the way past Malaysia and the Philippines to Indonesia. This result is summarized in a Latin expression, "*E Unibus Plurum*," the reverse of the U.S. Motto: "*E Pluribus Unum*" or in English "One [nation] Out Of Many [states]." This phrase "*E Unibus Plurum*," Many Out Of One," meaning that state actors in the Western Pacific rim are carving up international airspace to serve themselves, forecasts what is likely to escalate into a wider *déracinement* across Asia, possibly extending into Eurasia and adversely affecting the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the former Soviet Union, detrimental to Russian interests. This upheaval across Asia cannot be discounted as a factor inspiring the Kremlin to pressure Ukraine to refuse to sign, or to delay signing, its long-awaited FTA with the European Union. This upheaval across Asia is even more likely to have instigated the active animosity between Russia and Turkey with China lingering quietly but hardly passively in the background: Turkey eyes the parametres of its own former Ottoman Empire, Russia will not permit reconstruction of that age-old arch enemy, nor will China, either. Both China and Russia have resolved to pre-emptively attack reconstruction of an Ottoman Empire. The difference is in their strategies and tactics: Russia deploys military force, China unleashes economic force in the form of its "New Silk Road" and "New Maritime Silk Route" it is extending from Pakistan to (or through) Ukraine across Eurasia.

Bali "Package"?

Finally after decades of squabbling the 159 countries that form the "World" Trade Organisation (WTO) agreed at the Ninth Ministerial Conference of the "World" Trade Organisation (WTO) held from 4-7 December 2013 at Nusa Dua, Indonesia, to settlement of differences between developed and developing nations by reducing import and export obstacles to free trade that benefitted the former at the expense of the latter, following a compromise that allows India to continue its subsidies to domestic farmers as part of a food procurement programme, long opposed by the United States and other developed nations (Schneider 2013). Economic forecasts predict this will increase global gross domestic product (GDP) by from One to Two Trillion USD and create up to 34 million jobs worldwide (Hufbauer & Schott 2013). This is what one might call a "realigning definition" because it changes a longstanding relationship between the rules for the developed countries and the rules for developing ones. It is likely to displease China as much as or even more than any other nation: China is functionally developed, and it encounters challenges routinely in WTO dispute resolution chambres and in the American and European courts of law over its routine practice of granting Chinese companies commercial subsidies. In fact, the controversy over subsidies is absurd and meaningless because every day worldwide we consume what the Chinese economy has made using subsidies.

Trade "Agreements" or the Management of Trading Paradigms?

At fault as well for this emerging *déracinement* are several international trade agreements being negotiated in Europe and North America, especially, but also including ASEAN block and Latin American countries. They are excluding China deliberately, particularly from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) originated by New Zealand and Chile, but also from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) intended to bridge Europe with the Western Hemisphere (Feldman 2013). Unhelpful to this result is a relatively new Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiated between the European Union and its first Asian FTA partner, South Korea, that appears to have deliberately bypassed China, Chinese Taiwan, Japan, and the ASEAN block generally. From these paradigms collectively, mistrust has erupted, manifest near and far, such as with Egypt's newest flirtation with the Russian Federation, and the abrupt eleventh hour reversal of the Ukraine as it decided to back away from an FTA with the EU and go with the Russian Federation notwithstanding objections from much of its population West of the Dnieper River, a determination that prompted an even greater déracinement when Ukraine forced its incumbent president, Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko, to flee to Russia, replacing him by election with its current president, Petro Oleksiyovych Poroshenko. These events also reflect changing "definitions," alone and in combination.

Leadership

Undoubtedly, the "root definition" that is changing globally and across Asia is leadership. Whether this change is from bad to worse or good to better remains to be seen. With leadership change in any form at any time or place, new leadership will be tested. It is very likely that the core test of leadership in Asia at the present moment rests in a change of Chinese presidency and premiership from Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabo to Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. Other changes have occurred in the premierships of Japan and South Korea. To be sure, each nation possesses its unilateral authority to change governments and forms of governance. When this does occur, each new leadership should be prepared for the burden of power, and as the instruments of power are passed from one holder to others some challenges invariably will emerge to be confronted. New leaders must pass or fail each test presented. This déracinement in Asia is hardly evidence that leaders are passing this test. What appeared to some in 2012 to be a "Sunrise at ZhongNanHai" (Jones, 2012) turned out instead to be a twilight for China thusfar. If it becomes a "Sunset at ZhongNanHai," the worst alternative course of action for China, this is likely to be a Vikramaditya or "Bright as the Sun" period for India. China should get its leadership act in order fast.

EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES

Already what must be deemed a *déracinement* of foreign economic policies has begun to emerge across Asia and in the international economic relations between Asian nations and each other as well as between Asian nations and the world. This catalysed a set of events that already is beginning to achieve a *déracinement* of military alliances as India and Japan flirt with the Russian Federation in a transparent fear of China, and one after another Asian country boldly carves out its own ADIZ over international waters, all the while defiantly refusing to give recognition to parallel ADIZs maintained by neighboring nations. Asian nations that dissipate time on needless squabbling will miss the marque of harnessing technology, fall to the wayside. In scoping the environment trying to find the "best fit" politically, they will discover eventually that no "best fit" exists, besides an harmonious rapport with the world generally, with all neighbors equally. What nation(s) accept this principle the soonest will become Asia's leaders economically in the short term and then politically tomorrow. Negative "definitions" should be offset by positive "definitions" and innovative "new technologies provide this answer.

Some other definitions have revealed characteristics that seem both positive and negative, but possibly more positive than negative, such as increased volume of trade (trade creation) between the ASEAN block and China across the first decade of the 21st century. Trade creation as a positive definition is set-off by definitions that some will perceive as negative, such as the purchase of goods from inefficient suppliers and the rise of unemployment in countries or regions that have a high cost of labour, occasioned from bilateral trade agreement tariff reductions (trade diversion). Such is the example of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and its impact on the trading patterns among the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, Korea) and ASEAN+6 (China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand). Table 1 reflects the growth of trade between China and the ASEAN bloc from 2000 that increased continuously, but jumped much more during the second half of the first decade of the 21st century. Between 2000 when the CAFTA was proposed and 2010 when it was established, bilateral trade grew rapidly by more than factor four, as did this share of both the ASEAN's and China's total trade.

Table 1. China-ASEAN Trade Statistics, 2000 to 2009. (USD Billion)

Year	Total Amount	Export Amount	Import Amount
2000	32.31	14.18	18.13
2001	31.91	14.52	17.39
2002	42.76	19.55	23.21
2003	59.64	29.06	30.58
2004	89.07	41.35	47.72
2005	113.40	52.26	61.14
2006	139.96	65.01	74.95
2007	171.12	77.95	93.17
2008	192.53	85.56	106.97
2009	178.18	81.59	96.59

SOURCE: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2010, ASEAN Secretariat, Some data has been adapted by this author.
http://www.asean.org/images/archive/documents/asean_statistical_2010.pdf

Table 2. Trade Between ASEAN Block and China, 2007 to 2009 (USD Billion).

Country	2007			2008			2009		
	Total	Export	Import	Total	Export	Import	Total	Export	Import
Brunei Darussalam	0.36	0.11	0.25	0.22	0.13	0.09	0.42	0.14	0.28
Burma	2.08	1.7	0.38	2.63	1.98	0.65	2.91	2.26	0.65
Cambodia	0.93	0.88	0.05	1.14	1.1	0.04	0.95	0.91	0.04
Indonesia	25	12.6	12.4	31.51	17.19	14.32	28.38	14.72	13.66
Laos	0.27	0.18	0.09	0.4	0.27	0.13	0.75	0.38	0.37
Malaysia	46.39	17.69	28.7	53.56	21.46	32.1	51.96	19.63	32.33
Philippines	30.62	7.5	23.12	28.64	9.13	19.51	20.53	8.58	11.95
Singapore	47.4	19.62	17.52	52.48	32.31	20.17	47.86	30.07	17.79
Thailand	34.64	11.97	22.67	41.3	15.64	25.66	38.21	13.31	16.3
Vietnam	15.12	11.89	32.3	19.46	15.12	43.4	21.05	16.3	4.75

SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook 2010, Ministry of Commerce, China. Some data has been adapted by this author. http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/tongji2010.shtml.

Table 2 reflects the reality that as China both imports from and exports to Malaysia more and more, Malaysia is replacing Singapore as China's most important ASEAN partner. Most ASEAN trade with China is conducted by five ASEAN countries ("ASEAN-5"): Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia, as Table 2 reflects below. They were the original countries to form the ASEAN block on 8 August 1967. Thereafter, ASEAN was joined by Brunei Darussalam in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Burma (Myanmar) in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

In addition, it is important to note that some scholars have questioned whether many ASEAN members will benefit from the CAFTA (Thangavelu 2010). At the 2014 World Economic forum (WEF) annual meeting held in Davos, Switzerland, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi gave an interview to Professor dr Joseph S. Nye, Jr., former dean of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and cofounder (with Robert O. Keohane) of the Neoliberal School of international relations, in which Wang articulated three commitments held by China in foreign policy: justice, righteousness, practicing equality (Chinese FM 2014). In explanation, Wang argued that always China extends the same courtesies to smaller nations as it does to larger nations, implying that other larger nations and trading blocks such as the European Union and its members behave differently. It is exactly because the three commitments are not practiced in Asia that *déracinement* has followed. This is the fault of the major players in Asia.

Another question is whether trade between China and ASEAN is in commodities that will facilitate growth. In 2009, ASEAN exported primarily HS Code 85, 84, and 27 commodities to China (ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2010a):

Table 3. Changes in Top 20 Exporters' Share of ASEAN Export Market, and Average Annual Growth Rate, 1990-2009 and 2005-2009.

Rank	Country	Change in Exporter's Share (%) 1990-2009	Change in Exporter's Share (%) 2005-2009	Change in Growth Rate (%) 1990-2009	Change in Growth Rate (%) 2005-2009
1	USA	-3.88	-2.38	0.56	3.25
2	Japan	-4.29	-1.07	-0.92	-1.92
3	China	3.07	2.99	3.91	9.70
4	Australia	-2.37	-2.65	0.88	0.67
5	France	1.03	1.24	2.59	5.29
6	India	3.34	1.48	6.26	4.92
7	UK	-1.50	-0.80	-0.84	-2.06
8	Korea	-2.05	-0.58	1.27	3.96
9	Germany	0.11	-0.18	0.86	3.87
10	New Zealand	1.04	0.09	3.01	3.35
11	Argentina	2.60	0.91	5.70	3.28
12	Netherlands	-0.34	-0.62	0.74	-1.20
13	Brazil	3.12	2.20	7.32	12.76
14	Canada	-0.71	-0.11	1.73	2.39
15	Switzerland	-0.29	-0.37	1.59	1.43
16	Italy	0.06	0.08	3.33	3.50
17	Pakistan	-1.29	-0.15	-4.91	8.15
18	Belgium	1.27	-0.08	3.89	2.04
19	Spain	0.36	0.03	3.28	0.01
20	South Africa	0.73	-0.03	6.30	2.91

SOURCE: COMTRADE, U.N. Statistics Division, based on Four digit HS Code used to select 323 items across 20 year time period by Aung, Tin Tin and Hanho Kim. 2012. "Trade Competitions Between China and Other Top Exporting Partners in the ASEAN Agro-food Market," International Agriculture Trade Research Consortium (IATRC) Annual Meeting. 9-11 Dec. San Diego. http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/142913/2/Sess9_Kim_12-2012.pdf.

85 Electrical machinery, equipment and parts; sound equipment, television equipment
USD 21.630 Billion 26.5%
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances, parts thereof
USD 12.295 Billion 15.1%
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation, bitumin substances; mineral wax
USD 11.212 Billion 13.7%

In the same year, 2009, ASEAN countries imported primarily HS 85, 84, and 72 commodities from China (ASEAN Statistical Yearbook. 2010b):

85 Electrical machinery, equipment and parts; sound equipment television equipment
USD 28.414 Billion 29.4%
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances, Parts thereof
USD 23.191 Billion
72 Iron and Steel
73 Iron and Steel Articles
USD 5.658 Billion 5.9%

Clearly in many respects, China and its major ASEAN trading partners purchase and sell the same product categories to each other. Presumably, this suggests that China outsources to ASEAN the manufacture of component parts it will assemble into finished products to be sold to its larger trading partners. Some indicators of an emerging trade way seem to be springing up along the Western Pacific rim, evidenced by the changes in agro-food exports to the main ASEAN block countries by the world's largest food exporters, as Table 3 below reflects.

China and India have gained competitive advantage, and this causes each to direct anger toward the other. The flip side of this coin as evidenced also by Table 3 above documents that just as China has consistently increased its export share of agro-food products to the ASEAN buyers, Japan's share has decreased, prompting Japan to gaze at China covetously, and the United States to eye China cautiously.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) initiated its Shangri-la Dialogue in 2012, and this has been held each year thereafter at the Shangri-la Hotel in Singapore. The keynote speaker at the 12th Shangri-la

Dialogue held on 31 May 2013 to 02 June 2013 was the prime minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Tan Dung. The Chinese delegate last year was Lieutenant General Zhang Qinsheng, deputy chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) general staff. One could interpret this as China's displeasure that smaller ASEAN nations appear to be favored at recent Shangri-la Dialogue annual meetings. If this is true, China is likely to be less pleased that at the 13th annual meeting of the Shangri-la Dialogue held on 30 May 2014 to 01 June 2014, the keynote speaker will be Japan's prime minister Shinzo Abe. Quietly, China has come to believe that the Shangri-la Dialogue is squeezing it out of the group, year by year encouraging active participation by China's competitors to put China in what they feel should be its "place," that place being very different for the global leadership role China contends it deserves from its growing wealth and proven concern for championing the causes of developing nations. In 2013 an undercurrent at the 12th Shangri-la Dialogue meeting pointed squarely toward "security" in the Western Pacific, and by that word "security" China came to feel many if not most other Shangri-la Dialogue participants were pointing at security *from* China instead of *with* China. Evidence to support this perception came in the form of guest speakers: Christian Le Miere, IISS Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security, and Geoffrey Till, Professor of Maritime Studies at King's College London, who the IISS website said "provided insight on the South China Sea disputes, the regional power balance, and the implications of maritime tensions for regional and global security" (Maritime Security 2013). This came at a time when trade between China and many ASEAN nations, particularly the ASEAN-5 including Singapore, was increasing continuously in both exports and imports (see above), prompting China to perceive if yet to articulate that the ASEAN recipients of Chinese largesse have become ungrateful to China, in large measure in their effort to court the favor of Japan, emerging rapidly as China's arch-rival in maritime competition along the Western Pacific rim. Accompanying this hostile rhetoric are United States and Allied fear of Chinese expansion of naval and air assets along the Western Pacific rim, disguising offensive as defensive missiles and other ordnance (Capaccio 2014).

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION: "ADDITIVE TECHNOLOGIES"

Many alternative courses of action abound. They should have been considered by the actors and their "handlers" from abroad already, but apparently were forgotten. The best alternative will be for private sector businesses to step into the ring to shore-up the existing trade relationships between and amongst the sparring parties of South Asia and East Asia. Amongst a myriad of alternative courses of action in the industrial sector are "old industry" manufacturing that China came to do well late in the 20th century, carrying over into the early 21st century. That is archaic as we approach the second one-seventh of the 21st century, largely because of "new technologies" that allow many (soon to be most) products to be manufactured at home or in neighborhood stores. This technology is known colloquially as three-dimensional ("3D") printing, an "additive" manufacturing technology. The country, probably an Asian country, that springs the fastest into producing effective and efficient low cost 3D printing machines and materials to feed such machinery will be the economic leader of the present century.

China became "factory to the world" because it assembles the parts required for most products consumed in the territories of its major trading partners, Europe and the United States. This will be insufficient to keep China growing: to enable it to expand or even to maintain its current GDP across the next decade, or even up to 2020, only six years away. Instead of manufacturing or assembling consumer products, China and/or India must make and distribute to the world 3D printing machines displaying ever changing innovative technology, as well as the substances (materials) required to manufacture consumable products that such machines will output. Said simply, the 21st century world will require a 3D printer in every home much as image printers occupy a place on every desktop presently, and the world will require an advanced (commercial) 3D printer in every store where average consumers will go to collect whatever products they want and will have ordered electronically: shirts and shoes, truffles and ytres, even cookware and computers. Each home, each store, will become a "factory" just as Canton (Guangzhou) became a "factory" by assembling products to export during the Qianlong Period (1735-1795) at Guangzhou in the 18th century (Jones 2013), because the assembly of products will be at home or in neighborhood stores soon, not in China or any other distant location. There is not time for déracinement in politics because each moment must be devoted to technological rapprochement just in order to maintain, then to expand, economic growth. Innovation has been lacking in Asia, this trend must stop. In future, Asia will no longer produce actual garments, household utensils, automotive parts, or computer hardware as we know such products nowadays. It will produce the means to enable and empower consumers around the world to do this for themselves. An entirely new market is waiting. This market will equalise consumption in poor and rich countries alike within the lifetimes of almost everyone reading this article.

Innovation in 3D printing will enable and empower people everywhere to have access to Healthcare and nutrition that is at the cutting edge of science. It must be repeated: successful enterprises of the 21st century and beyond will not deliver products to be consumed: they will deliver household and storefront machinery capable of enabling and empowering individuals to produce what they need themselves, at home or in stores right in their own communities. This will include many food and beverage products difficult to purchase uncontaminated in developing countries, cosmetics, medicines, vitamins, unavailable without dispensing chemists (pharmacists) in rural communities, as well as hospital and surgical equipment and disposables required for diagnosis and treatment including organ transplants. This signals the approach of a new "age" equal or superior in importance to the Information Age, now appearing to be at full maturity. Will developing countries try to corner this market, or leave it to already developed nations to hoard, then extend to selected developing nations at a price markup?

MANAGEMENT AS CHANGE AGENTS

Management of private sector enterprises across Asia need to step in to reverse this escalation of rhetoric before it translates into hostile actions. In fact, subsidies become harmful not because of their cost to government but on account of their cost to innovation. Managers of private sector business enterprises should not be reactive to what governmental leaders do or say. On the contrary, managers should lead proactively. One method is that managers should direct subsidies that come their way into innovation. Very seldom do officials at central, regional, or local levels of government in China make any effort to control product output. Company managers are free to produce whatever they want, more or less. It is their own complacency that leaves them reinventing the wheel year after year, waiting for customers to walk in the door or ring them up on the telephone or send an email message. They must refocus corporate strategies, use government subsidies to purchase and operationalise additive technologies for example. Chinese managers approach subsidies as disposable income when subsidies should be approached as investment capital. To properly approach additive technologies will not be easy, anymore than to properly approach innovation generally is easy. In the end result, it will be worth this effort. This is the line of demarcation that will distinguish Asian companies that will thrive in the future from those doomed to failure that will close. In 2013, bankruptcies affected 10 Chinese industries the hardest, and each industry hit hardest is a traditional one such as shipbuilding, cargo shipping, iron, steel, furniture manufacturing, and financial management ("Waves of Bankruptcies in 10 Chinese Industries" 2013). Managers should resist the temptation to close shoppe, migrate abroad, leaving workers behind. This is the time to change industries away from those that have entered maturity and decline and into those that offer growth.

EMERGING "EMPIRES": THE NEW "GREAT GAME" ACROSS EURASIA

Almost exactly one decade and a half into the 21st century, various states large and small determined to test their hand at the building of "empires," in each case gazing at the past longingly, without much foresight into the future. Such "empires" are three-fold: one is atavistic, one is a cartoon, another is ersatz. Together they give an outward appearance at least of forming a 21st century version of the "Great Game" that Great Britain played with Imperial Russia across the 19th century to gain control over Eurasia (Hopkirk 2006).

Russia: An Atavistic "Empire

Russia seems to be trying to test its hand at reconstructing "Glorious Russia" as in the refrain to its National Anthem: "Славься, Россия!" or "Slavsya Rossija" meaning "Be Glorious, Russia!" This appears to be an historical yearning at least from the period of H.I.M. Catherine II that ended with the 18th century, failing to realise that when H.I.M. Yekatarina II (Catherine II) or "the Great" demised, Russia was insolvent much as it will be again soon unless it reverses course. This does not mean that Russia should not "be glorious" at all, because from its sacrifices it deserves to be. This does mean that it will become glorious once again only through peaceful endeavours, or the use of force sparingly in partnership with the West, such as against ISIL. Deploying force unilaterally, such as to occupy the Crimean Peninsula, is counter-glorious and tarnishes the image of a great nation. At present, the administration of Russian President Vladimir V. Putin is behaving in an atavistic manner, as a "throwback" to a bygone period when nations were permitted to assume sovereignty "by right of conquest" instead of by recognition from other states, much as some criminologists such as 19th century Italian positivist Cesare Lombroso depicted violent criminal offenders (Ellwood 1912). Russia has adopted a policy that should be termed nationalism atavism. Instead of progress alongside most of the 21st century world that approaches globalisation, Russia has adopted regression, to its own detriment, perhaps to the benefit of the West. Just as China has polluted its own environment by manufacturing the goods the rest of the world, particularly the West, requires, Russia appears bent on fighting the battles on the outcome of which the rest of the world, particularly the West, also depends.

Regressive behavior is not bad all the time, however. An example is when prison officials rely upon prisoner "politicians" for information and "right guys" to enforce prison rules amongst the prison general population (Schrag 1961). Russia fulfills this role at the moment in Syria when it attempts to enforce global norms and standards with ISIL and other Syrian rebel force. Russia's president appears to witness Russian military deployment in Syria to be an "exercise" or some form of training for greater action to come (Bertrand 2015). Be that as it may, intervention both displays Russia's rising military might and its tactics, rendering visible tactics and strategies that night well be better kept invisible.

Russian Federation leaders should be considered to be "Right Guys" in their interaction with the leadership of the rest of the world: they follow their own norms and standards punctiliously, they just fail to conform to the changing standards of other world leaders. In contrast, United States leaders may be considered to be "Square Johns" once more drawing from Schrag's typology, with the leaders of ISIL being "Outlaws" because they fail to conform to any world standards, the old or the new, and the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) being a "Ding" because of his recurring irrational behavior and outbursts. What is Turkey is more difficult to assess, but probably a "Politician" under Schrag's guidelines, playing East against West, the other territories of the former Ottoman Empire against each other, leading Sunni states of the Middle East such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia against leading Shia states such as Iran.

Turkey and a "New Ottoman": A Pantomime "Empire"

Turkey appears to be bent upon reconstructing the long bygone Ottoman Empire, failing to note that the original version imploded much as did the Soviet Union 70 years afterwards, because each was inefficient, made less viable by its own gargantuan size. Although both China and Russia command visible spheres of influence globally, while Turkey lacks vassal territories. It is rumoured that Turkey and some of its leaders have benefitted from ISIL, particularly although not exclusively from purchasing and then reselling petroleum products ISIL has pilfered from its occupation of Syria and Iraq ("Erdogan Denies" 2015). If Turkey envisions itself as being destined to lead the Sunni Muslim world, first it will have to displace Saudi Arabia, then other existing nation states in the region none of which are its vassals, then the former provinces of the former Soviet Union, each of which waited decades to control its own destiny, none of which seem eager or even willing to emerge as Turkish or Neo-Ottoman vassal states. What Turkey projects is the appearance of a pantomime "empire," of a cartoon caricature, of mythology such as "Popeye" who merely by eating "spinach" can suddenly and inexplicably take on and then change the world. By itself, Turkey lacks the ability to even occupy neighbouring territories, much less to maintain them coherently and harmoniously as vassal states, tasks that it would have to do if it were to re-inaugurate the Ottoman Empire with itself as a caliphate.

China the Ersatz "Empire"

China appears to envision itself as becoming an empire again by wealth alone, reminiscing about having been the world's wealthiest country during the Ming Dynasty, forgetting that it was about the poorest large nation on earth between 01 October 1949 and 1980 when Deng Xiaoping looked to the West to "open China" to international trade in goods it assembled or manufactured. What China projects is the prototype of an industrious nation in the process of transforming from a labour economy to a capital economy as much of its international manufacturing business goes South to its ASEAN neighbours on account of rising cost of labour in China itself, together with unacceptable corruption. It may aspire to imperial status at least regionally, but for the moment as well as for the foreseeable future, China is at most an ersatz "empire," proclaiming what it would like to be that in reality is far more than what it is. As but some examples among many others, China is not a global military power, nor is the Chinese culture, admirable as it is in an historical context, sought after by the rest of the world in an age of globalisation, as China's prestigious Chongqing Military Command warned late in 2015 (Blanchard 2015). Aspirations by China to become an actual empire once more along the Western Pacific rim after longer than one century serve to keep the playing field competitive, and serve to discourage the rise of Japan again in the same region after longer than half a century. An ersatz "empire" by China across Asia functions to encourage not only competition amongst nations but competition amongst free market corporations from different countries, as Fidler forecasted nearly a quarter century back (Fidler 1992). This condition actually provides evidence that Fidler's forecast was accurate in at least one other respect: "the distinction between a *public* realm of competition transpiring between States and a *private* sphere of competition occurring between private entities is somewhat artificial" (Fidler 1992, 563, emphasis in the original).

CONCLUSION

Déracinement of foreign economic policies and foreign military alliances in Asia stands to shift the balance of power, possibly symmetrically, possibly asymmetrically, and very likely from order into chaos unless managed very carefully very soon. What is springing up across Asia is potentially volatile, likely to expand across Eurasia and into Europe as fragile alliances, long beneficial to trade, appear to be entering a period of upheaval. The reason for such *déracinement* is not yet entirely clear, but appears to be spawned by changing "definitions" in how the game is, or ought to be, played. Aggregated, definitions that used to foster order suddenly have begun to foster disorder then chaos, much as in differential association theories contend that definitions favorable to law abiding behavior must exceed those unfavorable to the same, or criminality and deviance will result. India appears to have led Japan toward the camp of the Russian Federation and away from that of the United States, quietly if not surreptitiously, crafting a figurative bonnet atop the Northern perimetre of China. In turn, this appears to have inspired China to not only increase its military assets and position them toward Japan in the Northeast, the Philippines in the Southeast, and India in the Northwest, but to redirect many of its economic assets Southward toward the ASEAN block, in compensation, exerting an impact upon the agro-food trading patterns at least with the ASEAN-5 countries, the larger half of that pact. Part of this should be considered to be positive, such as China's quest for a Southwest Passage across Burma-Myanmar and a Northwest Passage across Pakistan, both in an effort to access the Indian Ocean, maritime gateway to Europe and Africa.

What is questionable is the seemingly forced drive of China Southward to Malaysia, replacing Singapore as China's top ASEAN trading partner, and Indonesia, home to a significant Chinese diaspora, inhumanely abused by Japan during World War II, possibly receptive to increased Chinese political presence in the vector where Southeast Asia meets Oceana, undoubtedly a perceptual threat to Australia and New Zealand, the latter an originator of the TPP and the strongest visible force in an endeavor to keep China an outcast from trans-Pacific economic ties with Latin America for as long a time as possible. Russia and China must remain regional powers for the moment and foreseeable future. Each deserves to be welcomed more warmly into the transcontinental and transoceanic trading partnerships being created.

Much of what China, Russia, and Turkey should consider doing involves the acceptance, rather than the rejection, of "definitions" favourable to the Western way of life, to democracy, to the market economy, and to solving conflicts with neighbours by negotiation instead of violence. They harbor a common misconception they must overcome, and that is that real empires past or presence always have survived, some have even thrived, on support drawn voluntarily from their vassal states, as did the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the German Nation, for example. At present only the United States of America remotely qualifies as an "empire," a status it loathes, because alone among the large nations of the 21st century world it commands the respect of other nations that and people who fall within its sphere of influence. It is American cultural encirclement that has produced this desire by populations all across the world to "be American" (Jones 2015, 317-343). Status as an "empire" must be earned then gifted at the behest of the "vassal" states, not taken by coercion or by declaration. In the distant future, perhaps but only perhaps, China or another "empire" will replace the United States, but Fareed Zakaria and others who envision the emergence of a "post-American world" (Zakaria 2008) will have to wait, that will not happen anytime soon because no viable replacement for the United States of America is in sight anywhere on the horizon. The "American Way" and the West that the United States has created in the post-1945 period provides the only "definition" favourable to peace and prosperity across the foreseeable future.

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